






















A NEW WAY TO MEASURE COMPETITION 
 



























This paper introduces a new way to measure competition based on ¯rms' pro¯ts.
Within a general model, we derive conditions under which this measure is monotone in
competition, where competition can be intensi¯ed both through a fall in entry barriers
and through more aggressive interaction between players. The measure is shown to be
more robust theoretically than the price cost margin. This allows for an empirical test of
the problems associated with the price cost margin as a measure of competition.
JEL codes: D43, L13
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1. Introduction
A question often asked in both economic policy and research is how the intensity of competition
evolves over time in a certain sector. To illustrate, a competition authority may want to monitor
an industry so that it can intervene when competition slackens. Alternatively, there may have
been a policy change in an industry (e.g. abolishing a minimum price or breaking up a large
incumbent ¯rm) with the goal of intensifying competition in the industry. Afterwards policy
makers want to check whether the policy change had the desired e®ect. In economic research,
there are empirical papers trying to identify the e®ect of competition on ¯rms' e±ciency (Nickell
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1(1996)), on ¯rms' innovative activity (Aghion et. al. (2002) and references therein) and the
e®ects of competition on wage levels (Nickell (1999) for an overview) and wage inequality
(Guadalupe (2003)). The question is how should competition be measured for these purposes.
The price cost margin (PCM) is widely used as a measure of competition for these pur-
poses. However, the theoretical foundations of PCM as a competition measure are not very
robust. Theoretical papers like Amir (2002), Bulow and Klemperer (1999), Rosentahl (1980)
and Stiglitz (1989) present models where more intense competition leads to higher PCM in-
stead of lower margins. We believe that there are two reasons why PCM is still such a popular
empirical measure of competition. First, we do not know how important these theoretical coun-
terexamples are in practice. Is it the case that in 20% of an economy's industries the structure
is such that more competition would lead to higher PCM or is this only the case in 1% of the
industries? In the former case there would be big problems for the empirical papers mentioned
above which use PCM as a measure of competition. In the latter case, the theoretical coun-
terexamples do not seem to pose acute problems for empirical research. As long as there is no
evidence that the theoretical counterexamples are important empirically, one would expect that
PCM remains a popular competition measure. The second reason for the popularity of PCM
is that the data needed to get a reasonable estimate of PCM is available in most datasets.1
The idea of the current paper is to develop a competition measure that is both theoretically
robust and does not pose more stringent data requirements than PCM. This new measure can
then be estimated in the same datasets as where PCM is estimated. This allows a comparison
between the new measure and PCM for a number of industries over time together. If in 99% of
the industries the two measures indicate the same development in intensity of competition over
time, this would indicate that the theoretical counterexamples cited above are not particularly
1Sometimes PCM is defended as measure of competition with reference to its interpretation as a welfare
measure (prices closer to marginal costs lead to higher welfare). However, as shown by Amir (2002) there is, in
general, no simple relation between PCM and welfare. The same is true for the measure introduced here: there
is no simple relation with welfare.
2relevant in practice. However, if in 20% of the cases the two measures diverged then one should
be more careful in using PCM as a measure of competition in empirical research and policy
analysis.
The measure we introduce in this paper is called relative pro¯t di®erences (RPD). It is
de¯ned as follows. Let ¼ (n) denote the variable pro¯t level of a ¯rm with e±ciency level
n 2 R+ (more details follow below on how variable pro¯ts and e±ciency are de¯ned). Consider
three ¯rms with di®erent e±ciency levels, n00 > n0 > n, and calculate the following variable
¼(n00)¡¼(n)
¼(n0)¡¼(n). Then more intense competition (brought about by either lower entry costs or more
aggressive interaction among existing ¯rms) raises this variable for a broad set of models. More
precisely, in any model where a rise in competition reallocates output from less e±cient to more
e±cient ¯rms it is the case that more intense competition raises
¼(n00)¡¼(n)
¼(n0)¡¼(n). Since this output
reallocation e®ect is a general feature of more intense competition, RPD is a rather robust
measure of competition from a theoretical point of view. Moreover, we show that the output
reallocation e®ect is a natural necessary condition for PCM to be decreasing in intensity of
competition, but it is not su±cient.
The intuition for RPD is related to the relative pro¯ts measure (¼ (n0)=¼ (n) is increasing in
intensity of competition for n0 > n) introduced by Boone (2000). The intuition for the relative
pro¯ts measure is that in a more competitive industry, ¯rms are punished more harshly for
being ine±cient. However, Boone (2000) analyzes the relative pro¯ts measure in a number
of speci¯c examples, not in a general framework as we use here. Next, as explained below,
it is harder to derive su±cient conditions for the relative pro¯ts measure to be monotone in
intensity of competition because of a level e®ect. This level e®ect is removed by working with
pro¯t di®erences instead of pro¯t levels.
The intuition why RPD is increasing in intensity of competition can be stated as follows. As
the industry becomes more competitive, the most e±cient ¯rm n00 gains more relative to a less
3e±cient ¯rm n than ¯rm n0 does (with n00 > n0 > n). Think, for instance, of a homogenous good
market where ¯rms produce with constant marginal costs. If these ¯rms compete in quantities
(Cournot), one would ¯nd (if n is close enough to n00) that ¼ (n00) > ¼ (n0) > ¼ (n) > 0.
If competition is intensi¯ed by a switch to Bertrand competition, the pro¯t levels satisfy:
¼ (n00) > ¼ (n0) = ¼ (n) = 0. Hence the rise in competition raises ¼ (n00) ¡ ¼ (n) relative to
¼ (n0) ¡ ¼ (n).
Recent papers measuring PCM include the following. First, Graddy (1995), Genesove and
Mullin (1998) and Wolfram (1999) estimate the elasticity adjusted PCM. This yields the con-
duct (or conjectural variation) parameter, which can be interpreted as a measure of competition.
This approach has been criticised by Corts (1999) who shows that, in general, e±cient collusion
cannot be distinguished from Cournot competition using the elasticity adjusted PCM. Second,
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and Goldberg (1995) estimate both the demand and cost
side of the automobile market. Their models can be used to simulate the e®ects of trade or
merger policies on the industry. Using their estimates, one can also derive ¯rms' PCMs. Nevo
(2001) uses the same methods to estimate PCMs for ¯rms in the ready-to-eat cereal industry.
He does this under three di®erent models of ¯rm conduct and then compares the outcomes with
(crude) direct observations of PCM. In this way he is able to identify the conduct model that
explains best the observed values of PCM. As we argue below, in these papers one would also
have been able to derive RPD, which has a more robust relation with intensity of competition.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model and the way
that more intense competition is identi¯ed in this general set up using the (generalized) output
reallocation e®ect. Section 3 shows that RPD is increasing in competition and discusses which
type of data are needed to estimate RPD in practice. Section 4 compares RPD and PCM
and argues that both require similar data to be estimated. Further, we show that whereas
the output reallocation e®ect is su±cient for RPD to be monotone in competition, it is only
4a necessary condition for PCM to be decreasing in competition, which explains the theoretical
counterexamples. Finally, section 5 concludes. The proofs of results can be found in the
appendix.
2. The model
The aim of this section is to introduce a fairly general model of ¯rms competing in a market.
To keep things general we do not impose either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We simply
assume that each ¯rm n chooses a vector of strategic variables an 2 RK. This choice leads
to output vector q (an;Q;µ) 2 RL
+ for ¯rm n where Q aggregates actions chosen by the ¯rms
in the industry that a®ect ¯rm n's output (see below) and µ is a parameter that a®ects the
aggressiveness with which ¯rms interact in the market. For instance, µ could be related to the
substitution elasticity between goods from di®erent producers or it could denote whether ¯rms
play Cournot or Bertrand competition. Further, the choices of the strategic variables also lead
to a vector of prices p(an;P;µ) 2 RL
+ for ¯rm n's products, where P aggregates actions chosen








for some functions ³ (:) and » (:) where we integrate over all ¯rms in the industry.2 To illustrate,






¯rm n produces one product and consumers spend an amount Y in this industry. Then ¯rm n










. In the notation used here, we get p(an;P;µ) = pn











2We allow ³ (:) and » (:) to be vectors. In that case the integration is done for each vector element separately
to obtain the vectors Q and P.
5Finally, we specify the costs of production for ¯rm n as C (q (an;Q;µ);n). We say that
n 2 R+ measures a ¯rm's e±ciency level because of the following assumption.
Assumption 1: For a given output vector q 2 RL














for each l 2 f1;2;:::;Lg, where the last inequality is strict for at least one combination of q and
l.
That is, higher production levels lead to higher costs. Further, higher n ¯rms produce the
same output vector q with (weakly) lower costs C and (weakly) lower marginal costs for each
product l. We assume that the e±ciency distribution in the industry is given. In particular,
we assume that n has an atomless distribution on the interval [n0;n1] with density function
f (:) and distribution function F (:). Although this distribution is exogenously given, the ¯rms
that are active in equilibrium is endogenously determined, as discussed below. The essential
assumption here is that e±ciency can be captured by a one dimensional variable n. This
assumption is not innocuous and will be discussed further below.
Using this set up, consider the following two stage game. In the ¯rst stage, ¯rms decide
simultaneously and independently whether or not to enter. Let's normalize actions an in such
a way that a ¯rm n that does not enter has an = 0 (while ¯rms that do enter have an 6= 0). If a
¯rm of type n enters it pays an entry cost ° (n); where ° is a continuous function of e±ciency n.
In the second stage ¯rms know which ¯rms entered in the ¯rst stage and all ¯rms that entered
choose simultaneously and independently their action vectors an.3 We de¯ne an equilibrium of
this game as follows.
3To simplify notation, we assume that all ¯rms with e±ciency n choose the same action an in equilibrium.





















¡ ° (n) < 0 implies ^ an = 0
where p(:)


















¡ ° (n) ¸ 0 for ^ an 6= 0
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Thus ¯rm n stays out of the market if it cannot recoup its entry cost °(n). Firms that enter
choose action an to maximize their (after entry) pro¯ts. In other words, we consider a subgame
perfect equilibrium here. Finally, we require the equilibrium to be consistent in the sense that
the aggregate variables ^ Q and ^ P follow from the equilibrium actions ^ an.
The following lemma derives an intuitive property of this equilibrium. If two ¯rms n¤ and
n with n¤ > n both enter and produce positive output levels, then n¤ produces (weakly) more
than n and n¤ is (weakly) more pro¯table.
Lemma 1 Consider two ¯rms n¤ and n < n¤ that both produce positive output levels in equi-
librium (i.e. ^ an¤;^ an 6= 0). Then
q
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We allow the entry cost ° to vary with a ¯rm's e±ciency level, ° (n). It may be the
case that more e±cient ¯rms face lower entry costs, °0 (n) < 0, because these ¯rms are more
e±cient in both entry and production. But we also allow for the case where more e±cient
¯rms pay a higher entry cost to realize their cost advantage, °0 (n) > 0. For instance, this
could re°ect investments in R&D to develop a better production technology, investing more in
capital or building a bigger factory to reap advantages of economies of scale. Thus an important
distinction between C (q;n) and ° (n) is that C (q;n) is weakly decreasing in n (for given q)
while the sign of °0 (n) is unrestricted.
The case with °0 (n) > 0 is also interesting as it allows for the selection e®ect of competition.
In particular, more aggressive interaction between ¯rms may lead to entry by more e±cient
¯rms at the expense of less e±cient rivals.
Example 1 Consider an industry with two ¯rms producing perfect substitutes where the de-
mand curve is given by p = 1 ¡ q1 ¡ q2.4 Firm i produces with cost function
qi
ni and faces
entry cost °i. Assume that n1 > n2 and n2 >
2n1
1+n1. If both ¯rms enter in Cournot equilibrium,





















in Bertrand equilibrium pB = 1
n2;qB














Consider the case where n1 = 100;°1 = 0:2;n2 = 3;°2 = 0. Then we ¯nd that ¼C
1 = 0:19 < 0:2
and hence ¯rm 1 does not enter. However, with Bertrand competition ¼B
1 = 0:22 > 0:2. Hence
more intense competition makes it possible in this case for the more e±cient ¯rm to recoup its
4Although the theory is developed for a continuum of ¯rms, we use examples with discrete ¯rms for two
reasons. First, such examples are often easier to verify. Second, it illustrates that the results derived here do not
crucially depend on the choice to model ¯rms as a continuum, although this assumption simpli¯es the analytical
exposition.
8entry cost. In this sense, the switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition selects the more
e±cient ¯rms into the industry at the expense of less e±cient ones.
Assuming that the second stage equilibrium in de¯nition 1 is unique, we can write the






















































i=1 denotes the intervals of ¯rms that enter the market. Since we allow for the
possibility that the entry cost ° rises with n we cannot exclude the case where ¯rm n enters
while a more e±cient ¯rm n0 > n stays out of the market as it cannot recoup its entry costs.




w1] denote the set of ¯rms that enter the market in equilibrium. Clearly,
the bounds ni
w0 and ni
w1 depend on the aggressiveness of interaction µ but this is supressed






In this framework we consider two ways in which competition can be intensi¯ed. First, an
across the board reduction in entry costs ¡d° > 0 (more formally, d° (n) = d° < 0 for all types
n 2 [n0;n1]) and second more aggressive interaction between players, parametrized as dµ > 0.
The key to the analysis is the following way in which more intense competition is identi¯ed in
this general framework.





















9n￿0￿ n￿1￿ n￿ n￿a￿ n￿b￿ n￿c￿ n￿d￿
Entry Cost￿
Profits￿
Figure 1: Entry costs °(n) and pro¯ts ¼(n;fni
w0;ni
w1g2
i=1;µ) as a function
of e±ciency n, with n1
w0 = na;n1
w1 = nb;n2
w0 = nc; and n2
w1 = nd.




i=1 is here taken




















is increasing in n.
Although these conditions do not look intuitive at ¯rst sight, we view them as a generaliza-
tion of the output reallocation e®ect to the case where q (:;n) is a vector.5 In the case where
¯rms produce homogenous goods, Boone (2000) and Vickers (1995) identify a rise in compe-
tition as a parameter change that raises output of a ¯rm relative to a less e±cient ¯rm. Put
di®erently, a rise in µ (or fall in °) raises
q(n¤)
q(n) for n¤ > n. In words, if more intense competition
reduces (raises) ¯rms' output levels, the fall (rise) in output is bigger (smaller) for less e±cient
5As we will show below these conditions are also natural candidates for necessary conditions to get the result
that more intense competition leads to lower PCM. However, in that case the conditions are not su±cient.






are increasing in n (5)
Note that the output reallocation e®ect does not assume anything about the output levels of
¯rms (only about relative output). This is important since we know that a change from Cournot
to Bertrand competition tends to raise output of e±cient ¯rms, while it reduces output for
ine±cient ¯rms. Thus there is no direct relation between intensity of competition and a ¯rm's
output level. Also, entry by new ¯rms (as a result of a reduction in entry barriers) can both
reduce every incumbent ¯rm's output level and increase ¯rms' output levels. See Amir and
Lambson (2000) for details.





ipate in the market, is the well known 'tupsy turvy' result. In the case where ¯rms produce
di®erentiated goods, it may be the case that there are twenty ¯rms under Cournot competition
while there are sixteen ¯rms under Bertrand competition. The reason is that Bertrand com-
petition leads to lower rents and hence fewer ¯rms enter in equilibrium. To avoid having to
resolve this ambiguity (more aggressive interaction but smaller number of players), we consider
the change in µ for a given set of ¯rms in the market. It is clear that a switch from Cournot to
Bertrand competition with given number of ¯rms in the market is a rise in competition. Only
in this clear cut case do we require the reallocation e®ect to hold.
If goods are not perfect substitutes,
q(n¤)
q(n) is not well de¯ned ('dividing apples by oranges').
Taking this into account and allowing each ¯rm to produce a number of products, it becomes
clear that the reallocation e®ect has to be expressed in money terms. In principle, there are
two ways to do that: costs C (q;n) and revenues pTq. The disadvantage of using revenues is
that prices p will be a®ected by µ as well as output q. To illustrate, intensifying competition by
making goods closer substitutes directly a®ects ¯rms' demand functions and prices irrespective
of a change in ¯rms' output levels. Hence costs C (q;n) seem a more natural choice here as it
11allows for the isolation of the e®ect of competition µ and ° on output q.
To gain further intuition for de¯nition 2, note that the conditions above can also be stated
as follows. Consider two ¯rms n¤¤ and n¤ < n¤¤. Then the reduction in costs due to a small







































The conditions above say that a rise in competition raises this ratio. That is, more intense
competition leads to a bigger fall in costs (due to the e±ciency gain dn > 0) for the high
e±ciency ¯rm n¤¤ as compared to the less e±cient ¯rm n¤.6 This makes sense. More intense
competition tends to marginalize ine±cient ¯rms by reducing their output levels. Therefore
their costs become less dependent on their e±ciency level. Consider the switch from Cournot






i = 1;2. With Bertrand competition, a small change in the e±ciency level of the ine±cient
¯rm has no e®ect on its costs. It does not produce anyway and hence
@C(q;n)
@n = 0. While under
Cournot competition, the same change in e±ciency of the ine±cient ¯rm does a®ect its cost
level. For the e±cient ¯rm, the e®ect of its e±ciency level on its costs is bigger under Bertrand














i (with ni > nj) goes up with a switch from Cournot to Bertrand
competition.
The next two examples illustrate this reallocation e®ect further.
Example 2 Consider an industry where each ¯rm i produces only one product, faces a demand
6In other words, if the model would allow for ¯rms investing in R&D to improve their e±ciency n, we would
see the following e®ect. More intense competition raises R&D investments of ¯rms relative to less e±cient ¯rms.
This is in line with results found by Aghion et. al. (2002).
12curve of the form




and has constant marginal costs 1
ni. Then ¯rm i chooses output qi which solves
max
q¸0







where we assume that a > 1
ni > 0 and 0 < d · b. Then the ¯rst order condition for a Cournot
Nash equilibrium can be written as






























Now assume that because of a fall in entry cost ° an additional ¯rm N + 1 with constant
marginal costs 1














increases after entry for ni > nj (i;j 6= N + 1).
Example 3 Consider an Hotelling beach of length 1 with consumers distributed uniformly over
the beach with density 1. Firm 1 is located on the far left of the beach and ¯rm 2 on the far
right. Firm i has constant marginal costs 1
ni (i = 1;2). A consumer at position x 2 h0;1i who
buys a product from ¯rm 1 incurs a linear travel cost tx, and if she buys from ¯rm 2 she incurs
travel cost t(1¡x). Assume that each consumer buys one and only one product and that he buys




As travel costs decrease, consumers are more inclined to buy from the cheapest ¯rm rather than
13the closest one. So as travel costs decrease, ¯rms' monopoly power is reduced and competition
is more intense. Parametrizing competition as µ = 1

































i for ni > nj.





















d(¡°) increasing in n. This is true for
more general cost functions as well, as the next lemma illustrates.
Lemma 2 Consider the case where a ¯rm produces only one product, L = 1. Assume that the

























is increasing in n, is su±cient for (3) to hold. The same is true for d(¡°).
Although the cost function in equation (9) looks nonstandard, it is quite general. It is, for
instance, routine to verify that ! (n) = 1




m=0 °mqm lead to a cost function of





for some constant ¡ > 0 and M+1 scalars °m. Indeed, the
case considered in the example above with C (n;q) =
q
n is a special case of this cost function.
Finally, to get some intuition for the multi-product case, consider the case where the cost
function C (q;n) can be written as C (q;n) = ! (n)Á(q) with ! : R+ ! R+;!0 (:) < 0 and
14Á : RL
+ ! R+ an increasing function of the output vector q. Then it is routine to verify that









d(¡°) are increasing in n)
holds at the product level for each product l.
3. New measure of competition
This section introduces relative pro¯ts di®erences, RPD, as a measure of competition and
discusses under which conditions this measure can be estimated using ¯rm level panel data.
Broadly speaking, the better one is able to separate ¯xed and variable costs in the data, the
more robust the competition measure will be that one can estimate.
The innovation of this paper is to measure intensity of competition in an industry by esti-
































´ > 0 (10)
for any three ¯rms with n¤¤ > n¤ > n, where ¼ (:) is de¯ned in equation (1). The following
theorem shows why this is a robust measure of competition.
Theorem 1 An increase in competition raises the expression in equation (10) for any three
















































































15To illustrate this result, consider the example in ¯gure 2. This is based on example 2 with
a = 20;b = 2;N = 20 and ¯rm i 2 f1;2;:::;20g has constant marginal costs equal to i
10
(hence e±ciency of i equals ni = 10
i ). Figure 2 has ¯rm n's normalized e±ciency level
n¡n
¹ n¡n on
the horizontal axis and n's normalized pro¯ts
¼(n;µ)¡¼(n;µ)
¼(¹ n;µ)¡¼(n;µ) (note that this is the inverse of the
expression in (10) to avoid dividing by zero for n = n) on the vertical axis with n · n · ¹ n









relation is increasing (more e±cient ¯rms make higher pro¯ts ¼). The more competitive the
industry, the more this curve is pulled into the corner at bottom-right. This is illustrated in
the graph for the case where competition is intensi¯ed by making goods closer substitutes (d
increases from 0:1 to 2). Further, with Bertrand competition, homogenous goods and constant
marginal costs one ¯nds that the curve is °at and equal to zero for all n 2 [n; ¹ ni and equal to
1 at n = ¹ n. This corresponds to perfect competition. Competition can now be measured as
the area under this curve. The smaller this area, the more intense competition is (note that
because of the normalizations used on the axes, this area under the curve lies between 0 and
1). In particular, in the Bertrand equilibrium just mentioned, the area under the curve equals
0.
Note that one does not need to observe all ¯rms in an industry to make a graph like the
one in ¯gure 2. Indeed ¯gure 2 also just uses a subset of the ¯rms (i 2 f1;:::;10g). The reason
is that the result in theorem 1 holds for any three ¯rms. This is in contrast to concentration
measures which make no sense if not all ¯rms in the industry are observed.
What type of data is needed to estimate the measure in equation (10)? The data we have in
mind is ¯rm or plant level data that specify per ¯rm total revenues, total wage bill (or preferably
wage costs split according to production workers (blue collar) and management (white collar),
see below), costs of inputs used, energy etc. Data sets like this are available in more and more
countries (usually at country's statistical o±ces where this data forms the basis of the national











Figure 2: Firm n's normalized pro¯ts
¼(n;µ)¡¼(n;µ)




accounts). Examples of papers using such data are Aghion et. al. (2002), Klette (1999), Klette
and Griliches (1999) and Lindquist (2001). Further, the data should be available at the four or
¯ve digit level such that the one dimensional e±ciency assumption is a decent approximation.
In particular, the more aggregated the data become, say at the two digit level, the more likely
it is that one ¯rm is more e±cient in producing one good and another ¯rm more e±cient in
producing another good within this two digit category. In that case, e±ciency is no longer a
one dimensional variable. As we will argue below, this one dimensional e±ciency assumption
is also necessary for the price cost margin as a measure of competition.
Equation (1) de¯ning variable pro¯ts ¼ (:), states that the costs C (q;n) should be included
in calculating pro¯ts while ° (n) should not be included. Hence ¼ (:) equals total revenue for a
¯rm minus costs C (q;n).
The following describes how to decide which cost categories in the data should be included
17in C (q;n) and which in ° (n). First, any costs, like materials and energy, that are viewed as
variable costs (i.e. varying with small changes in production) should be included in C (q;n).
Second, ¯xed costs that are seen as being positively correlated with a ¯rm's e±ciency level
should be included in ° (n) because only the costs ° are allowed to be increasing in n (see
assumption 1). Examples mentioned above are investments in R&D and capital stocks, where
higher investments may lead to lower marginal costs and hence higher e±ciency in production.
For cost categories in the data that are seen as ¯xed costs that do not vary with e±ciency, it
is immaterial whether they are included under C (q;n) or ° (n).7 Finally, with ¯xed costs that
fall with e±ciency, one has a choice whether to incorporate them under C (q;n) or ° (n). Here
the decision should be based on de¯nition 2 and the equilibrium properties of the model one
has in mind to describe the sector.















































































i are increasing in µ for ni > nj. Thus in this model one is free to choose whether
c0
ni is part of C (q;n) or ° (n). In other models, however, it may be the case that the conditions
in de¯nition 2 only hold when the ¯xed cost is categorized under ° (n). In that case it is
essential that these costs are not included in costs C (q;n) nor in pro¯ts ¼ (:). It appears to be
the case that the conditions in de¯nition 2 are more easily satis¯ed the more categories of ¯xed
costs are included under ° (:) and hence the closer C (0;n) gets to 0. In this sense, C (q;n)
should ideally include only variable costs and no ¯xed costs.
If the data allows the researcher to identify di®erent cost categories, variable costs should
be calculated as the sum of labour costs (if possible only the costs of (blue collar) produc-
7To see this, note that ¯xed costs that do not vary with n have no e®ect on the expression ¡
@C(q;n)
@n (in
de¯nition 2) and such ¯xed costs drop out when considering pro¯t di®erences ¼ (n¤)¡¼ (n) (in equation (10)).
18tion workers, since (white collar) managers tend to be viewed as ¯xed costs), material costs,
intermediate inputs and energy expenditure. Hence expenditures on or depreciation of R&D,
advertisement and capital should not be included in the variable costs nor in pro¯ts ¼ (:). Since
costs of depreciation that are economically relevant (instead of advantagous from a tax point
of view) are usually hard to come by, it is actually an advantage that such costs should not be
included in the calculation of ¼ (:).
However, if the dataset only speci¯es total costs per ¯rm, the observable pro¯t level is
¼ (n) ¡ ° (n). In that case, we need additional assumptions for the RPD measure to work.
The following proposition formulates conditions for the measure
¼(n¤¤)¡°(n¤¤)¡[¼(n)¡°(n)]
¼(n¤)¡°(n¤)¡[¼(n)¡°(n)] to be
monotone in µ and °.


















is nondecreasing8 in t 2 hn;n¤¤i is su±cient for the measure
¼(n¤¤)¡°(n¤¤)¡[¼(n)¡°(n)]
¼(n¤)¡°(n¤)¡[¼(n)¡°(n)] to be mono-
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! is decreasing in t 2 hn;n¤¤i is considered in Lemma 4 in the
appendix.














as a function of n. The intuition for this is the following. We know from above that a rise in
µ raises
¼(n¤¤)¡¼(n)
¼(n¤)¡¼(n) . That is, it raises the di®erence ¼ (n¤¤) ¡ ¼ (n) more in percentage terms
than it raises ¼ (n¤) ¡ ¼ (n). If °0 (n) falls 'too fast', the di®erence ° (n) ¡ ° (n¤¤) is going to
be big and hence ¼ (n¤¤)¡° (n¤¤)¡[¼ (n) ¡ ° (n)] is going to be big in absolute value. In case




@t dt (see appendix) becomes
too small to raise ¼ (n¤¤) ¡ ° (n¤¤) ¡ [¼ (n) ¡ ° (n)] more in percentage terms than the rise
in µ raises ¼ (n¤) ¡ ° (n¤) ¡ [¼ (n) ¡ ° (n)]. So we need to exclude this case to be sure that
¼(n¤¤)¡°(n¤¤)¡[¼(n)¡°(n)]
¼(n¤)¡°(n¤)¡[¼(n)¡°(n)] is increasing in competition. A similar intuition applies in case (ii).
Above we have focused on the partial e®ects of µ, taking the ¯rms active in the market as
given. As one would expect, if condition (3) in de¯nition 2 holds for the overall e®ect of µ (i.e.
taking the e®ect on the active ¯rms into account as well), then the overall e®ect of a rise in µ
is indeed to increase the RPD measure in equation (10).
























i=1 is taken into account, then the








































































This section compares the RPD and PCM measures of competition. We argue that the data
requirements to estimate these two measures are the same. Further, although some of the
assumptions made above (like one dimensional e±ciency) are not usually mentioned when PCM
is used as a measure of competition, we show that these assumptions are needed to interpret
a fall in PCM as an increase in competition. Finally, we show that the generalized output
reallocation e®ect in de¯nition 2 is a natural necessary condition for PCM to be monotone in
competition, but it is not su±cient. This explains why RPD is a theoretically robust measure of
competition while there are counterexamples where a rise in competition leads to higher PCM.
Broadly speaking, there are two ways in the literature to estimate price cost margins. One
is to approximate ¯rm i's price cost margin by an expression like (see, for instance, Scherer and
Ross (1990:418))
revenuesi ¡ variable costsi
revenuesi
(12)
Using this to calculate PCM requires similar data as one needs to calculate pro¯ts ¼ (:) in (1)
as revenues minus variable costs. An important assumption in the PCM case is that average
variable costs can be used as an estimate for marginal costs. This is correct if marginal costs
are constant.9 Note that this assumption is not directly required for estimating ¼, since C (q;n)
is allowed to take any form. However, for the RPD measure we need to rank ¯rms according to
their e±ciency level. And assuming that marginal costs are constant clearly makes the ranking
of ¯rms in terms of e±ciency n very simple. In other words, although assuming that marginal
costs are constant is, strictly speaking, not needed to estimate RPD, the assumption does make
the implementation of RPD a lot simpler.




p only measures the
price cost margin if
c(q)
q is equal to marginal costs. That is, if variable costs are of the form c(q) = cq and
marginal costs are constant.
21The other way to estimate price cost margins is to use a structural approach (see Reiss and
Wolak (2002) for a survey). In this case, the researcher speci¯es precisely what the demand
function and the cost function C (q;n) look like and what equilibrium is played by the ¯rms.
The data are then used to identify the speci¯ed demand and cost parameters. From this PCM
can be derived.
Note that the RPD measure is a variable that can be estimated in both ways. One can
estimate RPD in an analogous way as PCM is estimated in equation (12). But it is also possible
to use a structural approach and be more speci¯c about the functional forms of demand and
costs C (q;n). To illustrate, table VIII in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) contains all the
needed information (e±ciency n and variable pro¯ts ¼) to calculate RPD. Our paper just o®ers
RPD as a complementary competition measure to PCM and does not take a position on how
the measures should be estimated in practice.
When PCM is used as a measure of competition, it is not always explicitly assumed that
e±ciency is one dimensional nor that the e±ciency level can be observed. We argue, using
two simple examples, that these assumptions are, in fact, implicitly made once the estimated
PCM is interpreted as a measure of competition. The ¯rst example shows that information
about e±ciency is needed if one wants to interpret a higher price cost margin as less intense
competition.
Example 4 Consider the same, homogenous good, industry in two countries A and B. In
both countries, demand in the industry takes the form X (p) = 1
p where X (p) is the quantity
demanded at price p. Assume the most e±cient ¯rm in country A produces with constant
marginal cost equal to cA
1 = 1 and in country B with cB
1 = 3. Further, assume that the next
e±cient ¯rm produces with constant marginal costs cA
2 = 5 in country A and with cB
2 = 6 in
country B. If in both countries, the industry is characterized by Bertrand competition, one
¯nds that the equilibrium price cost margins equal PCMA = 4
5 and PCMB = 3
6. Clearly, the
22industry is more competitive in country A but PCM (without information on the marginal cost
levels of ¯rms) points in the opposite direction as PCMA > PCMB.
Indeed, Nevo (2001) compares the PCM generated by his estimated model with a (crude)
direct observation of PCM based on accounting cost data to see how the magnitude of PCM
should be interpreted in terms of intensity of competition.
The second example shows that in the multiproduct case where e±ciency is not one-
dimensional, more intense competition can be associated with higher PCM.
Example 5 Suppose that a researcher observes two ¯rms, 1 and 2, which both can produce two
goods, a and b. The data contain only information about aggregate sales and costs of both goods
at the ¯rm level. Instead of assuming that e±ciency is one dimensional, we assume that it is
two dimensional. More precisely we assume that ¯rm 1 is more e±cient than 2 in producing
good a while 2 is more e±cient than 1 in producing b: n1a = 10;n1b = 2:5;n2a = 2:5 and
n2b = 10. The cost function is of the form C (q;n) =
q
n for each ¯rm and product combination.
Finally, demand for good i(= a;b) is of the form pi = 1 ¡ q1i ¡ q2i. PCM for ¯rm f (= 1;2)





























2 = 0:68: Under Bertrand competition each ¯rm only produces the









= 0:75. In other words, if at the unit of observation the ¯rms produce more
than one product and the researcher wants to use PCM as a measure of competition, he has to
assume that e±ciency is a one dimensional variable. Put di®erently, he has to assume, as we
did above, that
@C(q;n)






@n · 0: the more e±cient ¯rm is (weakly) more e±cient
23in the production of all goods. Absent this assumption, an increase in competition can lead to
higher PCM.
As argued so far, the data requirements and assumptions for PCM and RPD to measure
competition are similar. The main advantage of the RPD measure is the robust theoretical
foundation for the relation between RPD and the intensity of competition. We will now ar-
gue that the generalized output reallocation e®ect in de¯nition 2 is a natural candidate for a
necessary condition to get that more intense competition leads to lower PCM. However, this
condition is not su±cient which explains theoretical counterexamples where more intense com-
petition leads to higher PCM. This is the sense in which RPD is a theoretically more robust









¼ (n) + C (q (n);n)
one can show the following result on the e®ect of competition on PCM.









































































One case for which one wants the result
dPCM(n)
dµ < 0 to hold, is the case where ° = 0. Hence







dµ < 0 for n > t. For the class of cost functions where
24C (q;n) = ! (n)c(q) this condition boils down to the output reallocation e®ect in de¯nition 2.
However, the conditition in de¯nition 2 is not su±cient to get
dPCM(n)
dµ < 0 because we cannot
exclude the case where more intense competition leads to lower output levels for ine±cient
¯rms. Hence
dq(n;µ)
dµ < 0 and ° > 0 works in the direction of
dPCM(n)
dµ > 0 and the output
reallocation e®ect is no longer su±cient.








d° > 0. For cost functions of the form C (q;n) = ! (n)c(q) this
again boils down to the reallocation e®ect in de¯nition 2. Again the condition is not su±cient





can go either way.
As with PCM, a necessary condition for the relative pro¯ts measure
¼(n¤¤)
¼(n¤) (introduced by
Boone (2000)) to be monotone in competition is the reallocation e®ect in de¯nition 2. As is
routine to verify, this reallocation e®ect is also su±cient for
¼(n¤¤)
¼(n¤) to be monotone in µ but not
for
¼(n¤¤)
¼(n¤) to be monotone in ° because of a level e®ect of d°.10 This level e®ect drops out when
considering di®erences, which explains why RPD needs less stringent su±cient conditions to be
monotone in both ° and µ than relative pro¯ts.








Table 1: increasing competition in example 2 by making goods closer
substitutes with c1 = 0:1;c2 = 6:5;c3 = 7;°1 = °2 = °3 = 0;a = 20;b = 2.
Lemma 3 considers the PCM of an individual ¯rm. However, the question of the paper
concerns the measurement of industry competition. This is usually done by calculating the
10More precisely, pro¯ts can be written as ¼ (n) = °+
R n
nw ¼0 (t)dt where nw is the least e±cient ¯rm to enter.
When ° changes this has three e®ects on ¼ (n) (which can potentially go in opposite directions): (a) direct e®ect
of °, (b) e®ect of ° on nw and (c) the e®ect of ° on ¯rms' conduct which appears in ¼0 (t). Only e®ect (c) is




25weighted industry average PCM, where the weight of a ¯rm equals its market share in the
industry (see, for instance, Wolfram (1999)). Tables 1 and 2 show simulations to illustrate
that industry PCM is not monotone in competition while RPD does pick up what happens to
competition in these two cases. Both tables work with the framework introduced in example
2 with a = 20;b = 2;d = 1:5 and Cournot competition. In table 1 there are three ¯rms with
constant marginal costs equal to c1 = 0:1;c2 = 6:5;c3 = 7. Competition is intensi¯ed by making
goods closer substitutes (raising d to d = 2). The PCM for ¯rms 2 and 3 falls, but industry
PCM goes up as competition is intensi¯ed. The reason is the output reallocation e®ect: as
competition is intensi¯ed, output is reallocated from ¯rms 2 and 3 to the most e±cient ¯rm
1 which is the ¯rm with the highest PCM. This increases the weight of ¯rm 1 in the industry
average PCM and thus raises the industry PCM. RPD (de¯ned here as
¼(c2)¡¼(c3)
¼(c1)¡¼(c3) which is the
only point that changes with d in a graph like ¯gure 2)11 falls with the rise in d indicating
correctly that competition becomes more intense. Table 2 considers the case of a fall in entry
costs d° = ¡0:1 for all ¯rms. In particular, it considers the following costs distributions
c1 = c2 = 0:1;c3 = 3;c4 = c5 = 6 and °1 = °2 = 16:5;°3 = 5;°4 = °5 = 0:7. Before the fall in
°, there is a Cournot equilibrium where ¯rms 1;3;4 and 5 are active. Firm 2 cannot pro¯tably
enter in this equilibrium. After the across the board reduction in ° however, this equilibrium is
broken and ¯rm 2 can enter at the expense of ¯rm 5. Although PCM falls for each individual
¯rm, the industry average PCM goes up as ¯rm 2 has a higher PCM than ¯rm 5. Again RPD
(de¯ned here as
¼(c3)¡¼(c4)
¼(c1)¡¼(c4); as above the only relevant point in a graph like ¯gure 2) falls with
the fall in entry costs, correctly indicating more intense competition.
11That is, with c3¡c
c3¡c1 on the horizontal axis the other two points are (0;0) and (1;1).










Table 2: increasing competition in example 2 by reducing entry costs
(d° = ¡0:1) with c1 = c2 = 0:1;c3 = 3;c4 = c5 = 6;°1 = °2 = 16:5;
°3 = 5;°4 = °5 = 0:7;a = 20;b = 2;d = 1:5.
¤ n.a. = ¯rm is not active in equilibrium
5. Conclusion
This paper started o® with the observation that PCM is often used as a measure of competition
in empirical research. From a theoretical point of view, however, it is not clear what the relation
between PCM and competition actually is. There are a number of theoretical papers where
more intense competition leads to higher PCM. At the moment we do not know how relevant
these theoretical counterexamples are from an empirical point of view.
To answer this question we have developed a new measure of competition, RPD, which has
two properties. First, RPD has a robust theoretical foundation as a measure of competition.
It is monotone in competition both when competition becomes more intense through more
aggressive interaction between ¯rms and when entry barriers are reduced. Second, the data
requirements to estimate RPD are the same as the requirements to estimate PCM. That implies
that any ¯rm (or plant) level data set which allows a researcher to estimate PCM should also
allow for the estimation of RPD. In this way we can see in which percentage of industries both
measures point in the same direction. If it turns out that the measures are congruent for more
than 95% of the industries, PCM can be used as a measure of competition in empirical research
without much concern for the theoretical counterexamples.
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29Appendix A. Proof of results
This appendix contains the proofs of the results in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 1
We use a proof by contradiction. Suppose that q (n) > q (n¤) > 0. Let p¤;q¤ (p;q) denote




¤ ¡ C (q
¤;n




¤ ¡ C (q
¤;n) ¡ [pq ¡ C (q;n)] · 0





















@q@n < 0 in assumption 1.
The proof that ¼ (n¤) ¸ ¼ (n) follows from the observation that n¤ can copy what n does
and do so at (weakly) lower costs since n¤ > n. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2



























dµ to be increasing in n is the output reallocation e®ect. For the cost


























Proof of Theorem 1
First note that for any di®erentiable function ¼ of n it is the case that
¼ (n
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The same proof applies to the case with d(¡°) instead of dµ. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 1
As in the proof of theorem 1, we can write the di®erence in pro¯ts as
¼ (n
¤¤) ¡ ° (n




































































dµ > 0 for t > n¤.
Under assumption (i) in the proposition it is the case that ¡
@C(q(t;µ);t)
@t ¡°0 (t) > 0 and hence





@t ¡ °0 (t)
i
dµ
32is increasing in t. This can be written as
d[g(t)h(t)]





















is nondecreasing in t ensures that h0 (t) ¸ 0. The conditions under (i) then make sure that both
g (:) and h(:) are nonnegative and hence we ¯nd that
d[g(t)h(t)]
dt = g0 (t)h(t) + g (t)h0 (t) > 0.







dµ < 0. Q.E.D.
With a similar argument the following result can be proved.



















is decreasing in t 2 hn;n¤¤i is su±cient for the measure
¼(n¤¤)¡°(n¤¤)¡[¼(n)¡°(n)]
¼(n¤)¡°(n¤)¡[¼(n)¡°(n)] to be monotone
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with similar expressions for d(¡°).
Proof of Lemma 3



































C(q(n);n) with respect to µ (taking nw as given) we get the expression in the
lemma.
Similarly we ¯nd that
dPCM(n)












Evaluating this expression gives the equation in the lemma. Q.E.D.
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